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According  to conventional  wisdom,  currencies  that come  under  speculative
attack can  be defended  with high  interest  rates. By raising  interest  rates  high  enough,
the conventional  wisdom  argues  that the monetary  authority  can  make  it prohibitively
costly  for speculators  to take short  positions  in the currency  under  attack. High interest
rates  are often also  said to convey  a positive  signal  regarding  the commitment  of the
monetary  authority  to maintaining  a fixed  exchange  rate. To the extent  that this signal
alters  the expectations  of foreign  exchange  market  participants,  high  interest  rates  can
serve  to strengthen  the domestic  currency.  A classic  example  in support  of the
conventional  wisdom  is the response  to the attack  on the Swedish  krona  in the summer
of 1992,  shown  in  the top panel  of Figure 1. Between  July  and August,  speculative
pressures  against  the krona resulted  in a loss  of nearly  one-quarter  of the reserves  of
the Swedish  central  bank. To stem  the outflow,  the central  bank's  marginal  lending  rate
was raised  to an incredible  500 percent  on September  17 and 18, and hovered  in  the
vicinity  of 50 percent  for the next  week. Reserve  losses  were promptly  halted,  and  the
krona's  peg was maintained.
Recently,  a contrarian  view of the effects  of high  interest  rates  during  speculative
attacks  has  emerged,  which  calls  into  question  both  tenets  of the conventional  wisdom.
First,  it notes  that interest  rates  have  to be increased  to very high  annualized  rates  in
order to entice  even risk-neutral  investors  to hold local  currency-denominated  assets  in
the face of a small  expected  devaluation  over  a short horizon,  and such  extremely  high
interest  rates are  rarely  observed  in practice.' Second,  this view  notes  that the signaling
value  of high interest  rates  is unclear. Although  signals  must  be costly  in order  to be
credible,  often they  impose  costs  that are  too high  for the monetary  authority  to take  in
stride. If market  participants  know  that the monetary  authority  is concerned  about  the
contractionary  effects  of high  interest  rates on domestic  economic  activity,  they are
unlikely  to believe  that rates  will be kept high enough,  and  for long  enough,  to deter
speculation.  Worse,  as the costs  of high interest  rates  mount,  the monetary  authority's
signal  can become  less  credible  over  time, raising  devaluation  expectations.  A vicious
1For example,  a risk-neutral  investor  expecting  only  a 0.5 percent  overnight  depreciation  would  requiie  an
overnight  annualized  rate  of return  of 500  percent  on domestic  currency  to compensate  for  the expected
devaluation.
1spiral  can result,  as expectations  of a devaluation  force higher  interest  rates,  which  in
turn impose  greater  costs on the economy.2  An example  consistent  with  this contrarian
view of the effects  of high interest  rates  is Korea  in the second  half of 1997,  shown  in
the lower  panel  of Figure 1. As the East  Asian  financial  crisis  spread  from Thailand  and
Malaysia,  speculative  pressures  against  the Korean  won intensified  and the reserves  of
the Korean  central  bank  fell from 35 billion  to 25 billion  US dollars  between  June and
November.  Although  the overnight  call rate  was raised  from around  12  percent  in early
November  to over  30 percent  by the end of December,  the won fell by over  50 percent
during  this period.
In light of these  theoretical  ambiguities  and conflicting  anecdotes,  this paper
asks  whether  there  is any systematic  empirical  evidence  in support  of the conventional
wisdom  regarding  the effects  of high interest  rates  during  speculative  attacks. To
answer  this question,  I study  the behaviour  of interest  rates  around  a large  number  of
successful  speculative  attacks  (i.e. attacks  that end in a sharp nominal  devaluations)
and  failed speculative  attacks (i.e.  attacks  that did not end in a devaluation)  in a sample
of 75 developed  and developing  countries  over  the period  1960-1997.  I examine
whether  interest  rates  rise during  failed  speculaltive  attacks  (i.e. whether  raising  interest
rates  is necessary  to prevent  a speculative  attack  from ending  in a devaluation),  and
whether  raising  interest  rates increases  the probability  that an attack fails (i.e.  whether
raising  interest  rates  is sufficient  to prevent  a speculative  attack from ending  in a
devaluation).
This  empirical  exercise  faces  three  difficulties:  measuring  the policy  response  to
a speculative  attack,  accounting  for possible  non-linearities  in the effects  of the policy
response,  and controlling  for the endogeneity  of the policy  response. First,  it is difficult
to disentangle  the monetary  policy  response  to a given speculative  attack  from other
sources  of variation  in observed  market  interest  rates during  the attack. For example,
increases  in market  interest  rates  during  a speculative  attack  might reflect  both a
tightening  of domestic  credit  by the monetary  aLuthority,  and also an increase  in the
2Drazen and Masson  (1994)  develop  a model  in  which  signals  become  less  credible  over  time.  Bensaid
and Jeanne  (1997)  formalize  devaluation  spirals. Radelet  and Sachs  (1998)  and Furman  and  Stiglitz
(1998)  discuss  other reasons  why  tighter  monetary  policy  can weaken,  rather  than strengthen,  the  currency
under  attack.
2devaluation  expected  by market  participants.  In order to obtain  a direct  measure  of the
monetary  policy  response  to speculative  pressures,  I rely primarily  on changes  in
interest  rates under  the control  of the monetary  authority  (i.e. central  bank  discount
rates)  as a measure  of policy. A drawback  of this measure  is that discount  rates  are
only one of many  instruments  that the monetary  authorities  have at their  disposal  to
resist  speculative  pressures. I therefore  also  check  the robustness  of the results  using
a variety  of other noisier  indicators  of the stance  of monetary  policy.
Second,  there  may be important  non-linearities  in the effects  of interest  rates  on
speculative  pressures,  and ultimately  on the outcome  of the attack. For example,  the
credibility  of the monetary  authority's  signal  of its intent  to defend  the currency  may
depend  on the economy's  ability  to withstand  the contractionary  effects  of tight monetary
policy,  or on  the quantity  of reserves  held  by the monetary  authority. In this case,
simple  correlations  between  measures  of monetary  policy  and the outcome  of
speculative  attacks may  obscure  any  effects  of policy  present  only in certain
subsamples  of speculative  attacks. I take  into account  the possibility  of episode-specific
variation  in the effects  of monetary  policy  by splitting  the sample  along  various
dimensions,  and by interacting  measures  of monetary  policy  with episode-specific
characteristics. 3
Third  and perhaps  most  important,  the policy  decisions  of the monetary  authority
are themselves  endogenous,  and are  likely  to depend  on both episode-specific
characteristics  that determine  speculative  pressures,  and on speculative  pressures
themselves.  Consider  an economy  that is vulnerable  to a speculative  attack,  perhaps
because  its real exchange  rate  is overvalued  or its reserves  are low relative  to its short-
term obligations.  If attacks  on  vulnerable  currencies  are both  more likely  to succeed,
and also are more  likely  to provoke  a strong  interest  rate  defense  on the part of a
"tough"  monetary  authority  committed  to maintaining  the fixed exchange  rate, one  might
expect  to find large  increases  in interest  rates  during  successful  attacks,  and
conversely,  small  increases  in interest  rates  during  failed attacks. This endogeneity
3A second  possible  source  of non-linearities  is in the time  dimension,  if, for example,  the signaling  value  of
tight monetary  policy  becomes  less  credible  over  time.  Since I will be relying  on the relatively  low-frequency
monthly  data  available  for this large  sample  of speculative  attacks,  there is unlikely  to be enough  time
series  variation  in each  episode  to identify  non-linearities  over  time in the effects  of monetary  policy.
3problem  may obscure  the positive  effects  of high  interest  rates  on investor  confidence
and the probability  that an attack  fails. It is also possible  that the endogeneity  bias
exaggerates,  rather  than obscures,  the conventional  wisdom  regarding  effects  of high
interest  rates.  For example,  if the monetary  authority  is "realistic"  and determines  that it
is futile  to try to defend  a highly  overvalued  currency,  but is willing  to vigourously  defend
the currency  when  it believes  fundamentals  are sound,  there may  be a positive
association  between  high  interest  rates  and failed attacks  driven  by common
fundamentals.  In this paper,  I present  a simple  model  which  formalizes  this endogeneity
problem,  and motivates  possible  instruments  for the monetary  policy  response. I then
use  these  to control  for the endogeneity  of policy  in a probit  specification  which
expresses  the probability  that a speculative  attack  fails  as a non-linear  function  of policy,
episode-specific  characteristics,  and interactions  between  the two.
The empirical  results  are not  very supportive  of the conventional  wisdom  that
high interest  rates  defend  currencies  during  speculative  attacks. I find no evidence  that
interest  rates  systematically  increase  during  failed speculative  attacks,  nor  that raising
interest  rates  increases  the probability  that a speculative  attack  fails. I obtain  the same
results  if I consider  alternative  measures  of monetary  policy,  as well as possible  non-
linearities  in the effects  of monetary  policy  due to differences  in a variety  of episode-
specific  characteristics.  The lack of evidence  orn  the efficacy  of monetary  policy  during
speculative  attacks  persists  even after I control  for possible  biases  induced  by  the
endogeneity  of policy. Although  there  appears  to be little  evidence  in support  of the
conventional  wisdom,  there is also little evidence  in support  of the contrarian  view that
raising  interest  rates  weakens  currencies  under  speculative  attack. In fact, the main
finding  of this paper  is the striking  lack of any  association  whatsoever  between  changes
in various  measures  of monetary  policy  and the outcome  of speculative  attacks.
This evidence  contributes  to a small  but growing  empirical  literature  on the role
of monetary  policy  during  speculative  attacks. 4 Goldfajn  and Gupta  (1999)  focus  on  the
There  is of course  a large  literature  on the effectiveness  of interventions  in foreign  exchange  markets  (see
Edison  (1993)  for a survey).  Various  authors  have  also  applied  VAR  methodologies  to estimate  the effects
of monetary  policy  shocks  on exchange  rates. These  papers,  which  focus  on normal  times as  opposed  to
the periods  of speculative  pressures  considered  in this paper,  find mixed  results. Eichenbaum  and Evans
(1995)  and  Cushman  and  Zha (1997)  find  that positive  innovations  to monetary  policy  lead  to depreciations
of  the domestic  currency  for the US and  for Canada,  respectively.  In  contrast,  Sims  (1992)  and Grilli  and
Roubini  (1995)  find mixed  evidence  in the G5  and  G7 economies,  respectively,  with positive  monetary
4role of interest  rates in  the aftermath  of large  devaluations  that result  in an
undershooting  of the real exchange  rate. They  ask whether  high interest  rates following
a devaluation  increase  the likelihood  that real  exchange  rate  equilibrium  is restored
through  a nominal  appreciation  rather  than  through  higher  inflation.  They  find that high
interest  rates  are effective  in this sense  only in countries  with  strong banking  sectors.
Furman  and Stiglitz  (1998)  examine  daily  data  on interest  rates  and exchange  rates  in a
sample  of nine  developing  countries  during  the 1  990s  to identify  episodes  of sustained
high interest  rates, and then  ask whether  these  were  followed  by an appreciation  of the
domestic  currency.  They  find little  evidence  that this is the case. In contrast  Dekle,
Hsiao  and  Wang (1  999a,b)  study  the relationship  between  interest  rates  and exchange
rates  using  weekly  data  for Korea,  Malaysia  and  Thailand  during 1997  and 1998,  and
argue  in favour  of the conventional  view. The main  difficulty  with all of these  papers  is
that they  simply  document  reduced-form  (partial)  correlations  between  interest  rates  and
exchange  rates. Without  controlling  for the endogeneity  of the monetary  policy
response,  it is difficult  to infer anything  regarding  the effects  of high interest  rates  from
these papers. This paper makes  a first attempt  to take seriously  the identification
problem,  drawing  on a much  larger  sample  of successful  and failed speculative  attacks. 5
The remainder  of this paper  proceeds  as follows. In Section  2, I describe  the
data and  the methodology  used  to identify  successful  and  failed speculative  attacks. In
Section  3, I present  some  descriptive  results,  which  provide  scant evidence  of any
association  between  changes  in interest  rates  and  the outcome  of speculative  attacks.
In Section  4, I develop  a simple  model  to illustrate  the endogeneity  problem,  and I use
this to motivate  a set of probit regressions  expressing  the probability  that speculative
attacks  fail as a non-linear  function  of policies  and  fundamentals.  After instrumenting
for the endogeneity  of policy,  I again  find no evidence  of a significant  impact  of high
interest  rates  on the outcome  of speculative  attacks. Section  5 offers concluding
remarks.
shocks  leading  to appreciations  in some  countries  and  depreciations  in others. Finally  there  is a large
empirical  literature  documenting  the properties  of macroeconomic  variables  around  speculative  attacks
(e.g.  example  Eichengreen,  Rose  and  Wyplosz  (1994,1995,1996)),  which  to date  has not  focused  on  the
policy  and  non-policy  determinants  of successful  and  failed  attacks.
This concern  with  the  endogeneity  of monetary  policy  is of course  not new,  and is a recurring  theme  in the
literature  on the effects  of monetary  policy  during  normal  times  (as opposed  to periods  of speculative
pressures).  See  for example  the discussion  in Bemanke  and  Mihov  (1998)  and Christiano,  Eichenbaum
and Evans  (1998).
52. Identifying  Speculative Attacks
I identify  successful  speculative  attacks  as large  nominal  depreciations  preceded
by relatively  fixed nominal  exchange  rates. I begin  with an unbalanced  panel  of monthly
observations  on nominal  exchange  rates (expressed  in local  currency  units  per  US
dollar)  and non-gold  reserves.  The sample  consists  of 75 middle-  and  high-income
countries  with populations  greater  than I million,  over  the period  January  1960  to April
1999. Details  of the data  can be  found in the Appendix. I first ideritify  all episodes  in
which  the one-month  depreciation  rate (i.e. the increase  in the nominal  exchange  rate)
exceeds  10%,  which  is roughly  two  standard  deviations  above  the mean  monthly
depreciation  rate for the entire  pooled  sample  of monthly  observations.  In order  for
these  large  depreciations  to be meaningfully  considered  successful  speculative  attacks,
it is necessary  that the exchange  rate be relatively  fixed prior  to the depreciation  itself.6
Accordingly,  for each  observation  I construct  an average  over  the previous  twelve
months  of the absolute  value  of percentage  chainges  in the nominal  exchange  rate. I
then  eliminate  all large  depreciation  episodes  fcr which this average  exceeded  2.5%,  or
about  one half  of one standard  deviation  from the mean for the entire  sample. In order
to avoid  double-counting  prolonged  crises  in which  the nominal  exchange  rate
depreciates  sharply  for several  months,  I further  eliminate  successful  attacks  that were
preceded  by successful  attacks  in  any of the prior  twelve months. Finally,  I discard  all
speculative  attack  episodes  for which  there  is no data available  on any  of the variables  I
will use  to measure  the monetary  policy  response  to the attack. This results  in 105
usable  successful  speculative  attack  episodes.
I identify  failed  speculative  attacks  using  two indicators  of speculative  pressures:
sharp  reserve  losses,  and  sharp  increases  in nominal  market  interest  rates.  Specifically,
I consider  all episodes  in  which  the monthly  decline  in non-gold  reserves  measured  in
US dollars  (the increase  in the nonminal  money  niarket rate  spread  over  the US Federal
Funds  rate) exceeds  20% (exceeds  5%),  which  is about  two standard  deviations  above
the mean  change  for the entire  sample. En  order  to restrict  attention  to speculative
6I only  require  the exchange  rate  to be 'relatively"  fixed  prior  to the devaluation  for  two reasons.  First,  this
enables  me  to identify  the abandonment  of narrow  target  zone exchange  rates  regimes  as well  as of  fully
fixed  exchange  rate  regimes. Second,  this  allows  me to identify  currencies  that are  pegged  against
currencies  other  than  the US  dollar  whose  value relative  to the US  dollar  does not  fluctuate  much  (e.g.  the
German  mark).
6pressures  against  relatively  fixed  exchange  rates, I eliminate  all those  episodes  for
which  the same  moving  average  of absolute  values  of changes  in the nominal  exchange
rate as before  was greater  than  2.5%. Next,  to avoid double-counting  successful
attacks,  I exclude  all episodes  in which  the change  in the nominal  exchange  rate in the
same month  or any  of the three  following  months  was greater  than 10%. I define  these
episodes  as failed  speculative  attacks  and,  as before,  I eliminate  all failed  attacks  that
are preceded  by a failed  attack  in any  of the twelve  previous  months,  and those
episodes  for which  indicators  of the monetary  policy  response  are not available.  This
results  in 203 instances  of failed speculative  attacks.
Relying  on reserve  losses  and increases  in market  interest  rate  spreads  to
identify  failed  speculative  attacks  is problematic,  because  these indicators  potentially
confound  speculative  pressures  and the policy  response  to these  pressures.  For
example  published  data on reserve  losses  does not permit  me to distinguish  between
transactions  of the monetary  authorities  to accommodate  the increased  speculative
demand  for their reserves,  and direct  sales of reserves  by the monetary  authority  in
order  to support  the currency. Similarly,  increases  in observed  nominal  interest  rate
differentials  may reflect  both  increases  in market  participants'  devaluation  expectations
as well as policy  interventions  in the money  market,  as noted  in the introduction.
However,  to the extent  that these  considerations  are important,  the results  will be  biased
towards  finding  that tightening  monetary  policy  makes  speculative  attacks  more  likely  to
fail, simply  because  the definition  of failed  attacks  in part reflects  the presence  of tight
monetary  policy. It is interesting  to note  that despite  this obvious  source  of bias in
favour  of the conventional  wisdom,  I find little evidence  of this view.
Table 1 lists  the full sample  of 308 episodes,  sorted  by success  and failure,  and
by year.  The sample  includes  a number  of familiar  episodes,  as documented  in Table  2.
The recent  spate  of currency  crises  in East  Asia in 1997  are all represented  as
successful  speculative  attacks,  with  the exception  of Malaysia  where  the largest  monthly
depreciation  of the ringgit  in August  1997  (6.6 percent)  was not large  enough  to qualify
as a successful  attack  according  to my definition. Table  2 also lists several  speculative
attacks  associated  with  the turmoil  in the ERM  in 1992, and compares  the dating  of
these  attacks  with  that of Eichengreen,  Rose and Wyplosz  (1994). My criterion
identifies  several  of well-known  failed  attacks  during  this period,  including  those  on the
7Danish  kroner,  French  franc, Irish  punt and  the Spanish  peseta,  as well as the
successful  attacks  on the British  pound,  the Swedish  krona and the Finnish  markkaa  in
the fall of 1992.7  In most cases,  the dating  of events  corresponds  fairly  closely  to thalt  of
Eichengreen,  Rose  and Wyplosz  (1994). The only large  discrepancy  is in the case  of
France,  where  they identify  a speculative  attack  in September  1992  which  I do not. T  his
is because  France's  reserve  losses  of 8 percent  in that month  are not large  enough
according  to my definition,  while  its much  larger  reserve  losses  in the fall of 1993  are.
Table 1 nevertheless  also includes  a number  of more  questionable  episodes.
Upon  closer  inspection,  many  of the episodes  occur  in country-period  observations
characterized  by underdeveloped  financial  markets  and/or  restrictions  on capital
movements  of various  sorts. It is unlikely  that the dynamics  of speculative  attacks  in
such  distorted  environments  will be comparable  with those  occurring  in countries  with
relatively  developed  financial  markets  and free  capital  mobility. In order  to ensure  that
the results  are not tainted by these  questionable  episodes,  I also define  a subsample  of
events  where  domestic  credit  to the private  seclor  as a share of GDP (a summary
indicator  of financial  development)  averages  more  than  20% in the five years  prior  to the
attack,  and  the black  market  premium  on foreign  exchange  (a summary  indicator  of de
facto currency  convertibility)  averages  less  than 10% in  the five years prior  to the attack.
I refer  to this subsample  as the financially-developed  subsample,  and the countries
included  in it are  indicated  with asterisks  in  Table 1.
In Figure  2, I provide  a graphical  overview  of successful  and failed  speculative
attacks,  plotting  the evolution  of the nominal  exchange  rate and reserves  during  "typical"
attacks. To construct  this figure,  I compute  the median  growth  rate in the exchange  rate
and reserves  over  all successful  and failed  attacks  for every  month  in a two-year  window
centered  on the date of the crisis,  and then  cumulate  these  median  growth  rates  on a
base  of 100 one  year prior to the crisis. By construction,  successful  attacks  are  marked
by sharp  nominal  depreciations  preceded  by 12  months  of very stable  exchange  rates.
In fact,  the median  change  in the nominal  exchange  rate prior  to these  episodes  is  zero.
Reserves  decline  steadily  over the entire  period  leading  up  to the collapse  of the
The  initial  attack  on  the  Swedish  krona  in  the  surnmer  of 1992  mentioned  in  the  introduction  does  not
qualify  as an unsuccessful  attack  according  to my  definition  since  it was  followed  by a depreciation  within
three  months.
8exchange  rate, indicating  that speculative  pressures  emerge  in advance  of the collapse
in the exchange  rate itself, and reserves  recover  fairly  quickly  afterwards. Failed  attacks
are also by construction  preceded  by very  stable  nominal  exchange  rates,  and feature
sharp  reserve  losses  in the month  of the attack. As with  successful  attacks,  reserves
recover  quickly  following  failed attacks.
The main  question  of interest  is whether  raising  interest  rates  -- or more
generally,  tightening  monetary  policy  --  prevents  speculative  attacks  from ending  in  a
devaluation  of the currency. To address  this question,  I require  measures  of the stance
of monetary  policy  around  the speculative  attack  episodes  identified  above.  I primarily
rely on  the real central  bank discount  rate (the  nominal  discount  rate deflated  by
contemporaneous  annualized  monthly  inflation)  as a measure  of the policy  instrument
most directly  under  the control  of the monetary  authority. 8 To the extent  that the
monetary  authority  uses  this instrument  during  a given episode,  this variable  provides  a
good  measure  of the policy  response  to the speculative  attack. However,  as noted  in
the introduction,  the monetary  authorities  in these  many  speculative  attack  episodes
have a wide  variety  of instruments  at their  disposal.  Attempting  to identify  the mix  of
instruments  actually  employed  during  each  of the 308 episodes  in the sample,  and
hence  the appropriate  episode-specific  measure  of the stance  of monetary  policy,  would
be ambitious  to say the least. 9 1  instead  use  two other measures  as crude "outcome"
indicators  of the stance  of monetary  policy  to check  the robustness  of the results: real
domestic  credit  growth,  and the reserves  of deposit  money  banks held in the central
bank. To the extent  that the monetary  authorities  tighten monetary  policy  using  other
measures  (e.g.  open market  operations,  raising  reserve  requirements,  etc.), this  will be
reflected  in a reduction  in real  domestic  credit  and/or  increases  in bank  reserves.'°
8  An unfortunate  drawback  of this measure  is that  central  bank  discount  rates  are reported  by the IMF  on an
end-of-period  basis  only,  so that intra-monthly  fluctuations  in this variable  are ignored.  Also,  there  is  of
course  considerable  debate  over how  to proxy  for expected  inflation  when  constructing  real interest  rates.
The  results  presented  here  do not change  substantially  if I deflate  using  either  past  or future  inflation  rates,
or if I simply  consider  changes  in nominal  discount  rates.
Even  for the United  States  which  has been  the  subject  of decades  of intensive  research,  there  is no  clear
consensus  on how  precisely  to measure  the stance  of monetary  policy. See  for example  the discussion  in
Bemanke  and  Mihov  (1998). See  also  Borio  (1997)  for a description  of  the bewildering  array  of instruments
available  in a set  of developed  countries.
10An  obvious  objection  to the domestic  credit  growth  measure  is  that it does  not distinguish  between  shifts
in the  supply  and shifts  in demand  for domestic  credit.  To alleviate  this concern  I have  also  defined  tight
9For each speculative  attack  episode,  it is necessary  to determine  whether  these
measures  of monetary  policy  tightened  or not, relative  to a suitable  benchmark.  For
failed attacks,  I consider  the increase  in real discount  rates,  the decrease  in real
domestic  credit  growth,  and the increase  in bank reserves  in the month  of the attack
relative  to the month  prior  to the attack. That is, I ask whether  tightening  monetary
policy  in response  to a sudden  reserve  outflow  serves  to arrest  further  reserve  losses
and maintain  the value  of the currency. Given  that speculative  pressures  appear  in
advance  of the actual  devaluation  during  successful  attacks,  I consider  the change  in
each measure  of monetary  policy  in the month  prior  to the aftack  relative  to the previous
month. That is, I ask  whether  tightening  monetary  policy  in response  to mounting
speculative  pressures  serves  to prevent  attacks  from succeeding.  I do not include  the
month  of the attack  itself,  so as not  to capture  any post-devaluation  policy  responses
which  may  be quite  different  from those  undertaken  in defense  of the currency  prior  to
the devaluation. 11
(loose)  monetary  policy  as periods  where  both  domestic  credit  growth  fell (increased)  and the discount  rate
increased  (fell),  with  substantially  similar  results.  A similar  objection  holds  for the bank  reserves  measure.
The  effectiveness  of monetary  policy  in the aftermath  of devaluations  is studied  by  Goldfajn  and Gupta
(1  999).
103.  Descriptive Results
In this section  I present  some  simple  descriptive  statistics  on the incidence  and
mean  value  of changes  in the stance  of monetary  policy  around  successful  and failed
speculative  attacks.  The siimplest  possible  graphical  overview  of the evidence  is in
Figure  3, which  reports  the frequency  distribution  of changes  in real  discount  rates
during  successful  and failed speculative  attacks. The striking  feature  of this graph  is
that there  is no apparent  difference  in the direction  or magnitude  of changes  in discount
rates during  successful  and failed  speculative  attacks. More  formally,  Table  3 uses
contingency  tables  to summarize  the changes  in monetary  policy  during  successful  and
failed speculative  attabks. The  three panels  of Table 3 correspond  to the three  different
measures  of tighter  monetary  policy: increases  in real discount  rates,  decreases  in real
domestic  credit  growth,  and increases  in bank reserves  as a share  of domestic  credit.
Each  panel  reports  a contingency  table,  with the columns  corresponding  to successful
and failed  attacks,  and  the rows  corresponding  to whether  monetary  policy  tightened  or
eased. Based  on these  tables,  I report  several  statistics  of interest. I first report  the
conditional  probability  that monetary  policy  tightens  given  that a speculative  attack  fails.
If the conventional  wisdom  is correct  and  tightening  monetary  policy  is a necessary
condition  to prevent  speculative  attacks  from ending  in a devaluation,  one would  expect
this probability  to be near one. In fact, it ranges  from 0.33  to 0.57, depending  on  the
measure  of policy. In each case,  the upper bound  of a 95% confidence  interval  extends
to no more  than 0.65. In fact,  for the first  two measures  of policy,  the 95% confidence
interval  includes  0.5, so that it is not even possible  to reject  the null hypothesis  that
tighter  and looser  monetary  policy  during  failed attacks  are equally  likely. This casts
doubt on the notion  that tightening  monetary  policy is necessary  to ensure  that
speculative  attacks  fail.
I also report  the conditional  probability  that a speculative  attack  fails given  that
monetary  policy  tightens. If the conventional  wisdom  is correct  and tightening  monetary
policy  is a sufficient  condition  for speculative  attacks  to fail, one would  expect  this
probability  also to approach  one. In this sample,  the estimated  probability  ranges  from
0.60  to 0.72,  with  a 95% confidence  interval  extending  to at most 0.80. This calls  into
1  1question  the idea that raising  discount  rates  is sufficient  to ensure  that speculative
attacks  fail.
More  formally,  I also report the p.-value  lor a chi-squared  test of independence
between  changes  in monetary  policy  and  the success  or failure of speculative  attacks.
For the first two measures,  it is not  possible  to reject  the null hypothesis  of
independence  at conventional  significance  levels,  suggesting  that there  is no
relationship  whatsoever  between  changes  in the stance  of monetary  policy  and  the
success  or failure  of speculative  attacks. For the third measure,  the null is (barely)
rejected  at the 95%  significance  level,  but this does not constitute  evidence  in favour  of
the conventional  view. To see  this, note  that the probability  that an attack  fails
conditional  on tightened  monetary  policy  is 0.60,  while  the unconditional  probability  that
an attack  fails is 177/263=0.67  - in other  words,  speculative  attacks  are significantly
less likely  to fail when  monetary  policy  is tighter  than in the sample  as a whole. The
rejection  of the null  of independence  tells  us that this difference  in probabilities  is
(barely)  statistically  significant.
In Table  4, I repeat  the analysis,  but restricting  the sample  to the financially-
developed  subsample  described  in the previous  section. One might  expect  that any
evidence  on the efficacy  of a high  interest  rate defense  would  be more  apparent  in  this
smaller  set of observations.  However,  the results  in Table  4 show  that this is not  the
case. Although  the conditional  probabilities  (of tighter monetary  policy  conditional  on
failure,  and of failure  conditional  on  tighter  monetary  policy)  are generally  a little  higher
in this sample,  they are still far from one,  and in no case  can I reject  the null  hypothesis
that changes  in the stance  of monetary  policy  and the outcome  of speculative  attacks
are independent.
These  results  have been  subjected  to a wide variety  of robustness  checks  that
are not reported  for brevity. These  include: (1) restricting  the sample  of events  to those
for which  all measures  of monetary  policy  are available,  (2) using  a three-month  instead
of a one-month  window  over  which  to measure  changes  in the various  indicators  of
monetary  policy  around  the speculative  attack,  (3) varying  the timing of changes  in
monetary  policy  relative  to the date  of the attack,  and (4) defining  tightened  monetary
policy  as episodes  where both  real  discount  rates increased  and real domestic  credit
12growth  fell. The main conclusion  that the stance  of monetary  policy  and the outcome  of
the speculative  attack  are independent  is robust  to all of these  variants.
While Tables  3 and 4  provide  a concise  summary  of the available  evidence,  they
discard  potentially  useful  information  by treating  changes  in policy  as binary  events,  i.e.
interest  rates,  domestic  credit  growth  or bank  reserves  increase  or decrease  only. I
relax  this restriction  in Tables  5 and 6, which  present  two sets of statistics  for the full
sample  of events  and the financially-developed  subsample,  respectively.  In the first
three columns  of both  tables,  I compute  the mean  change  in each measure  of monetary
policy  during  successful  and failed  speculative  attacks  and test the null hypothesis  that
they are equal. This may  be thought  of as a weaker  version  of the tests  of necessity  in
Tables  3 and 4, in the sense  that a rejection  of this null hypothesis  constitutes  evidence
that tightening  monetary  policy  is necessary  to prevent  speculative  attacks  from
succeeding.'2 In the next  two columns,  I estimate  the marginal  impact  of the change  in
each  measure  of monetary  policy  on the probability  that a speculative  attack  fails,
estimated  from a probit regression  including  a constant  term. I report  the  estimated
marginal  effect, and  the t-statistic  corresponding  to the null hypothesis  that the
underlying  coefficient  on the policy  measure  is zero. This may  be thought  of as a
weaker  version  of the earlier  tests  of sufficiency,  in the sense  that a positive  impact
suggests  that tightening  monetary  policy  raises  the probability  that an attack  fails. In the
final column  I report  the number  of observations  included  in each  test. The  three
panels  of each  table again  correspond  to the three measures  of changes  in the stance
of monetary  policy. 13
A further  drawback  of the previous  results  is that they do not allow  for the
possibility  that the effects  of monetary  policy  may  depend  on fundamentals  which  vary
across  speculative  attack  episodes.  In order  to take these possible  non-linearities  into
account,  the rows  of Table 5 report  results  for various  subsamples  corresponding  to
"good"  values  of such  fundamentals.  I first distinguish  further  between  financially
12 A stronger  test would  also  require  the  mean  tightening  in monetary  policy  to be positive  during  failed
attacks  and negative  during  successful  attacks.
13Unlike the data  description  in the previous  tables,  these  summary  statistics  are  not robust  to extreme
outliers  in the measures  of monetary  policy. I therefore  drop a small  number  of episodes  occurring  during
periods  of very  high inflation  where  measured  changes  in real  discount  rates  and real  domestic  credit
growth  are  greater  than 100  percent  in absolute  value.
13developed  and less-developed  episodes  by restricting  the sample  to the OECD,  and  to
the 1980s  and 1990s. Following  the suggestiorn  of Goldfajn  and Gupta  (1999)  that
interest  rate defenses  are only successful  when  the banking  system  is strong,  I restrict
the sample  to those  episodes  that were not preceded  by a banking  crisis  in any of the
previous  five years  in the rows  labelled  "No  Banking  Crisis". Since one might  expect
that tightening  monetary  policy  will only be  effective  if the exchange  rate  is not too
overvalued,  I construct  a crude  indicator  of real exchange  rate overvaluation  as the
trend growth  rate  of the real CPI-weighted  exchange  rate versus  the US in the previous
twelve months. In the rows labelled  "No Real  Cvervaluation",  I restrict  the sample  to
those  episodes  where  this growth  rate is below  the median  for the entire  sample. To
capture  the notion  that a given  defense  may  be more  credible  if the monetary  authority
can back  up its commitment  to a fixed  exchange  rate  with  a large  stock of foreign
currency  reserves,  I also divide  the sample  in half  according  to non-gold  reserves
relative  to imports,  and consider  only the high-reserves  subsample  in the rows  labelled
"High Reserves". I also proxy  for the overall  weakness  of the country's  external
payments  position  using  the average  over  the previous  twelve months  of that country's
borrowing  from the International  Monetary  Fund,  expressed  as a share of its quota  in
the organization.  In the rows  labelled  "Low  Quota  Drawings",  I consider  only those
episodes  where  the country  has  no obligations  to the IMF according  to this measure.
Finally,  I consider  the argument  that it is easier  to defend  against  a speculative  attack
during  a booming  economy  than during  a recession,  presumably  because  the domestic
economy  is better  able  to withstand  any  of the adverse  effects  of high interest  rates
during  the high  point in the business  cycle. I measure  this as the deviation  of real per
capita  GDP  growth  in a country  from its average,  in the five preceding  years,  and then  I
divide  countries  in two at the median  value  of this deviation  and consider  only the
booming  economies  in the rows  labelled  'High FPoint  in Cycle".
The results  in Tables  5 and 6 are not very  supportive  of the conventional  view
that tightening  monetary  policy  lowers  the probability  that a speculative  attack ends  in a
devaluation  of the currency. In the vast majority  of cases,  the mean  change  in monetary
policy  is not  significantly  different  during  failed and successful  attacks,  and changes  in
the stance  of monetary  policy  are  not statistically  significant  predictors  of the outcome  of
the speculative  attack. Only in five cases  are  the estimated  effects  statistically
significant  at the 95% level, notably  in the OECD  subsample.  However,  when one
14considers  that there  are 96 separate  hypothesis  tests in Tables  5 and 6, I should  expect
around  five rejections  at the 95%  significance  level  even if the stance  of monetary  policy
and the outcome  of speculative  attacks  were  independent.  Moreover,  even the  few
significant  results  in the OECD subsample  are  to a large  extent  driven  by a handful  of
successful  attacks  in Greece,  Turkey  and Portugal.
At first glance,  the descriptive  evidence  presented  in this section  is hardly
consistent  with  the view that tightening  monetary  policy  is effective  during  speculative
attack episodes.  At the same  time, it is also hardly  consistent  with the alternative  view
that tighter  monetary  policy  has  the perverse  effect  of weakening  the currency  under
attack. Rather,  this descriptive  evidence  suggests  a striking  absence  of any  systematic
relationship  between  the stance  of monetary  policy  and  the outcome  of speculative
attacks.
154.  The Endogeneity of Policy
Although  useful  as data  description,  the evidence  in the previous  section  can
provide  only limited  information  about  the effects  of policy  during  speculative  attacks.
Since policy  is itself  likely  to respond  endogenously  to the same  fundamentals  that drive
speculation,  and also  to the strength  of speculative  pressures  themselves,  it is difficult  to
infer  any structural  relationship  frorn  the correlatiorns  of the previous  section.  In this
section,  I present  a simple  model  which  formalizes  this issue  and illustrates  its
ambiguous  implications  for the evidence  of the previcus  section. 14 I then  empirically
address  the endogeneity  problem  by estimating  an instrumental  variables  probit model
that expresses  the probability  that a given  speculative  attack  ends in a devaluation  as a
non-linear  function  of fundamentals  and measures  of monetary  policy,  treating monetary
policy  as endogenous.  After controlling  for endogeneity  of policy  in this  way, I still  find
no evidence  that raising  interest  rates  either lowers  or raises  the probability  that a
speculative  attack  ends in a devaluation  of the currency.
A Simple Model
I consider  a one-period  moclel  of a srnall  open  economy  that fixes its exchange
rate  and comes  under  speculative  attack. The economy  is populated  by a continuum  of
identical  atomistic  speculators  of mass  one, and a rnonetary  authority.  The monetary
authority  sets  the domestic  interest  rate, i, at the beginning  of the period,  and at the end
of the period  decides  whether  or not  to devalue  the currency  by an  exogenously-given
and known  amount,  s.  Speculators  attack  the currency  by shorting  it, i.e. by taking  out
loans  in local  currency  at the interest  rate set.  by the monetary  authority  at the beginning
of the period,  selling  the proceeds  to the monetary  authority  in exchange  for US  dollars
at the beginning-of-period  exchange  rate, and then unwinding  their positions  at the end-
of-period  exchange  rate.  Speculators  determine  their  demand,  S,  for the reserves  of
14 See  Drazen  (1999),  Lahiri  and  Vegh  (1997,  1999)  and Lall  (1997)  for other  models  which  focus
specifically  on the role  of interest  rates  as a defense  during  speculative  attacks.
15  In practice,  shorting  the domestic  currency  during  speculative  attacks  is generally  done  using  forward
contracts,  rather  than  domestic  currency  loans. However,  the substance  of  the analysis  is not changed  by
this  complication.  See  Goldstein  et. al.  (1993),  Garber  and Svensson  (1995),  and Lall  (1997)  for details.
16the monetary  authority,  R, by maximizing  their  profits  net of borrowing  costs,  which  I
assume  for convenience  to be  quadratic  in the volume  of speculation:
(1)  max<s>  7*  S - 2
where  xt denotes  the representative  speculator's  perception  of the probability  that the
currency  will be  devalued.16  Solving  this optimization  problem  and aggregating  over  all
speculators  results  in a speculative  demand  for local currencyS(it,i)  =
The monetary  authority  decides  whether  or not to devalue  the currency  by
weighing  the costs  and benefits  of maintaining  a fixed exchange  rate. There  are  two
costs to fixing: the monetary  authority  must spend  a fraction  (R'  of its reserves to
R
defend  the exchange  rate, and in order  to maintain  a desired  level  of reserves,  it may
need  to set domestic  interest  rates  higher  than it would  otherwise  do in the absence  of
speculative  pressures.'7  These  costs are summarized  in  the following  loss  function  of
the monetary  authority:
(2)  L(7r  i,  *) = 57  i  0 * g
R
where  for simplicity  I have  assumed  that the monetary  authority's  disutility  of raising
interest  rates  is linear  in  the interest  rate,  with 0* measuring  the strength  of its aversion
to high  domestic  interest  rates. The parameter  0* is not known  to speculators,  who
16 This convenient  formulation  of speculative  behaviour  is used  by Drazen  (1999). In  the absence  of  such
adjustment  costs,  risk-neutral  speculators  will take  infinite  short  (long)  positions  in the currency  under  attack
if the expected  return  to shorting  is positive  (negative).  At the cost  of complicating  the algebra,  one can
also  motivate  a continuous  speculative  demand  for loans  by assuming  that  speculators  are  risk averse.
17 I follow  the conventional  (implicit)  assumption  that the monetary  authority  dislikes  reserve  losses  and
devalues  when  these  losses  are excessive.  However,  it is natural  to ask  why  this  should  be the case. One
might  also  imagine  that  the monetary  authority  does  not value  reserves  per  se,  but rather  dislikes  the
capital  losses  it suffers  following  a devaluation  when  it restores  its target  level  of reserves  by  purchasing
them  at the depreciated  exchange  rate. In  this case larger  reserve  losses  make  devaluations  more  costly.
Moreover,  raising  interest  rates  may  have  the perverse  effect  of raising  the rationally-expected  probability  of
a devaluation  by making  devaluations  less  costly  to the monetary  authority.
17share  a common  belief  that it is equal  to i.  Let ,B  dienote  the benefits  of maintaining  the
fixed  exchange  rate  regime. These  benefits  are also not known  to speculators,  who
correctly  perceive  D to be uniformly  distributed  on  the unit interval. Speculators  do  know
that if the costs of maintaining  a fixed  exchange  rate exceed  the benefits,  the monetary
authority  will devalue  the currency  to 1+E.
Speculators  rationally  form  their beliefs  regarding  the probability  that the
monetary  authority  will devalue,  given  their  perceptions  of the "type"  of the monetary
authority,  0, and given  the interest  rate  set by the mronetary  authority. In particular,
speculators  understand  that 7t  = Prob[L(ir,i,9)  > f3],  so that the rationally-perceived
devaluation  probability  is:  18
(3)  7  9  R . 2
R  l-£i-F
I plot  this probability  as a function  of the interest  rates  as a bold line in the top panel  of
Figure  4. At low levels  of the interest  rate,  the perceived  devaluation  probability  is
decreasing  in i. Over  this range,  speculation  against  the currency  is intense,  and the
marginal  benefit  of raising  interest  rates  (in  terms oi reducing  reserve  losses  S)
outweighs  the perceived  marginal  cost to the domestic  economy  (as measured  by the
parameter  i).  As a result,  raising  interest  rates  lowers  the monetary  authority's  disutility
of maintaining  the fixed exchange  rate,  making  a devaluation  is less likely. In contrast,
when  interest  rates  are high,  the marginal  benefit  of further  increases  in interest  rates  is
smaller  than the marginal  cost  to the domestic  economy. Over this range,  increases  in
the interest  rate raise  the disutility  of the fixed  exchange  rate regime,  and so raise  the
probability  that the currency  will be devalued.
18  To simplify  this calculation,  I assume  that  L(7r,i,  O)  < 1, so that Prob[L(j,i,  0)  > P] = L(r,i,  i) . It is
straightforward  to verify  that  this holds  in equilibrium  provided  that  the following  parameter  restriction  is
satisfied:  R  -.  +  < 1. This restriction  will hcld provided  that the devaluation  rate  e is
small  enough  and/or  the amount  of  reserves  R is large  enough,  which  together  ensure  that  the speculative
demand  for reserves  is never  too large.
18The question  of interest  in  this paper  is the slope  of 7c(i),  i.e. whether  raising
interest  rates  raises  or lowers  the probability  that a speculative  attack  ends in a
devaluation  of the currency. However,  estimating  Tl(i)  using  the data on speculative
attack episodes  described  in the previous  sections  is complicated  by two factors. First,
for a given interest  rate,  the slope  of 7r(i)  will depend  on episode-specific  characteristics.
This nonlinearity  is illustrated  in the lower  panel  of Figure  4, which  considers  two
speculative  attack  episodes  that are  alike  in every  respect,  except  that in the second  the
level  of reserves  is higher  than in the  first. Not  surprisingly,  the probability  of a
devaluation  is everywhere  lower  in the second  episode  than in the first, since  the
monetary  authority  has more  reserves  at its disposal  to defend  the exchange  rate. More
important,  at the same  level  of the interest  rate (indicated  by the vertical  line),  a small
increase  in interest  rates  in the first episode  will lower  the probability  of a devaluation,
while  in the second  episode  it raises  the probability  of a devaluation.
The second  difficulty  is that  the monetary  authority's  choice  of interest  rates  is
endogenous,  and depends  on the strength  of speculative  pressures  against  the
currency. In order  to illustrate  this endogeneity  within  the confines  of a very  simple
model,  I assume  that the monetary  authority  sets interest  rates  to minimize  the costs  of
maintaining  a fixed  exchange  rate. In particular,  I assume  that the monetary  authority
chooses  i to minimize  Equation  (2),  taking into  account  the dependence  of 7E(i)  as given
by Equation  (3). The optimal  interest  rate  chosen  by the monetary  authority  is:
(  )  R  (  ;*
and has a very natural  interpretation.  Other  things equal,  the higher  is the devaluation
rate e or the lower  are reserves  R, the greater  is the volume  of speculation  and  the
higher  is the interest  rate set by  the monetary  authority  to deter  this speculation.  The
greater  is the monetary  authority's  aversion  to high interest  rates (the  higher  is G*),  the
lower  is the optimal  interest  rate. Finally,  the more  speculators  think  the monetary
19authority  dislikes  high interest  rates  (the higher  is 0), the higher  the monetary  authority
needs  to raise  interest  rates  to reduce  speculation.' 9
The important  point is of course  that the inteirest  rate chosen  by the monetary
authority  in Equation  (4) depends  on  the same  fundamentals  as speculators'  perceived
probability  of devaluation  in Equation  (3). In Figure  5, I illustrate  how  this endogeneity
problem  can either  obscure  or accentuate  the effects  of tighter  monetary  policy  during
speculative  affacks.  In the top panel,  I again  consider  two episodes  that are  alike in
every  respect,  except  that in the latter  the reserves  of the monetary  authority  are higher
than in the former. At the equilibrium  in the first episode  at A, 7T(i)  is decreasing  in i, so
that a small  increase  in interest  rates  has  the conventional  effect  of lowering  the
perceived  probability  of a devaluation.  In the high  reserves  case,  the speculators'
rationally-perceived  devaluation  probabilities  are lower  than before  (shown  as a
downwards  shift in n(i)), while  the monetary  authority  reacts  to these  devaluation
perceptions  with  a lower  interest  rate  since it has a larger  "cushion"  of reserves. In this
episode,  the equilibrium  is at B with  a lower  interest  rate  and a lower  devaluation
probability.  Simply  comparing  these  two episodes,  one might  easily  be led to the
mistaken  conclusion  that raising  interest  rates raises  the probability  of a devaluation,
while  precisely  the converse  is true (since  both  A and B fall on the downward-sloping
portion  of 7rt(i)).
Similarly,  the endogeneity  problem  may  also lead  to the conclusion  that raising
interest  rates  has  the conventional  effect  of lowering  the probability  of a devaluation
when  in fact the opposite  is true. 11  illustrate  this possibility  in the bottom  panel  of Figure
5.  1  again  consider  two identical  episodes,  which  now differ  only in the monetary
authority's  distaste  for interest  rates  (0*)  and speculators'  beliefs  regarding  this
parameter  (0). The dashed  lines  correspond  to an episode  where  both  9* and  0 are
lower  than in the episode  shown  irn  solid lines.  Not  surprisingly,  the monetary  authority
sets a higher  interest  rate, and since  speculators  believe  that the monetary  authority  is
"tough",  the devaluation  probability  is lower  for every  interest  rate i (shown  as a
19 assume  that  the monetary  authority  knows  speculators'  perceptions  regarding  its type,  i.e. the monetary
authority  knows  0.  The  main  point  of the model  regarding  the endogeneity  of policy  is unaffected  if I
instead  assume  that  the monetary  authority  does  not know  0 Ibut  instead  takes  speculators'  perceived
devaluation  probabilities  as given  when  minimizing  Equation  (2).
I0downwards  shift in 7c(i)).  Comparing  the equilibria  A (with  a high  devaluation  probability
and a low interest  rate)  and B (with  a low devaluation  probability  and a high  interest
rate),  one might  easily  conclude  that raising  interest  rates  lowers  the probability  of a
devaluation  when  the converse  is true (since  both  A and B fall on the upward-sloping
portion of 7c(i)).
This discussion  illustrates  how the endogeneity  of policy  can bias the estimated
effects  of policy  in unknown  directions.  To the extent  that the fundamentals  that drive
both  speculative  pressures  and the policy  response  are  not fully observable,  partial
correlations  between  policy  and  the outcome  of speculative  attacks  will not correctly
identify  the effects  of policy. To achieve  identification,  I require  an exogenous  source  of
variation  in the interest  rate set by the monetary  authority  that can be used as an
instrument  for policy. In this stylized  model,  the monetary  authority's  private  information
about  its "type"  (0*)  plays  this role,  since changes  in 0* shift the monetary  authority's
reaction  function  without  shifting  speculators'  rationally-perceived  devaluation
probabilities.  More  generally,  any  private  information  of the monetary  authority  which
influences  its choice  of interest  rates  can in principle  serve  to identify  the effects  of
interest  rates  on speculators'  beliefs  that an attack  will end in the devaluation  of the
currency.
Empirical  Specification
I now  turn  to the empirical  specification  motivated  by  this simple  model. The
objective  is to estimate  the impact  of monetary  policy  on probability  that a speculative
attack  fails. Although  this probability  is not observable,  I do observe  a binary  indicator  of
whether  a speculative  attack  fails or not. I can  therefore  estimate  the marginal  effects  of
policy  on probability  that an attack  fails using  a probit  model,  with this indicator  as the
dependent  variable. The first implication  of the theory  is that this probability  will be a
non-linear  function  of fundamentals  and the monetary  policy  response.  Although  the
simple  model  discussed  above  is too stylized  to take the exact  functional  form implied  by
Equation  (3) literally,  it does suggest  that the explanatory  variables  in the probit equation
should  include  not  only measures  of policy  and fundamentals,  but also interactions
between  the two. Accordingly,  I consider  the following  non-linear  probit  specification:
21yi  =PO  +  l  ii + P2'fj + 3'  fj *  ij +u
(~  ~  ~  ~~~~~  ) ,if  Yj* > 
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where  yj*  is an unobserved  latent  variable;  yj is an indicator  variable  taking  the value  1 if
speculative  attack  j ends in a devaluation;  ij is a measure  of the stance  of monetary
policy;  fj is a vector  of episode-specific  fundamentals;  and u;  is a normally-distributed
disturbance  term.  I consider  the same  three  measures  of the stance  of monetary  policy
(i 1) as in the previous  section: increases  in real discount  rates,  decreases  in  domestic
credit  growth,  and increases  in the reserves  of the banking  system,  and five of the
measures  of fundamentals  (f 1) discussed  in the previous  section: the presence  of
banking  crises,  the extent  of real  overvaluation,  the adequacy  of reserves,  indebtedness
to the IMF,  and the point in the business  cycle  prior to the speculative  attack.
The second  implication  of the theory  is that ij is endogenous  and reacts  to the
same  fundamentals  that drive  speculative  pressures. To the extent  that the observed
fundamentals  included  in fj do not capture  all of these  factors,  the error  term in Equation
(5)  will be  correlated  with  policy.  It is therefore  necessary  to instrument  for both  ij  and
f, ij in the above  regression.  The  theory  indicates  that variables  that are  the private
information  of the monetary  authority  and influence  its choice  of monetary  policy  are
candidate  instruments.  I rely  on  two instruments,  both  of which  exploit  informational
asymmetries  that are  likely  to exist  between  speculators  and the monetary  authorities.
The  first is the change  in reserves  (expressed  in months  of imports)  in the month  of the
attack. Since  in most  countries  the monetary  authority  publishes  data  on its reserves
only with  a lag, it will have information  on  the extent  of aggregate  speculative  pressures
reflected  in reserve  losses  in advance  of market  participants  who do not have  timely
access  to this data. To the extent  that the monetary  authority  bases  its policy  response
on its observed  reserve  losses,  this  instrument  will be correlated  with policy. To the
extent  that these  reserve  losses  are unknown  to speculators,  they will affect  speculative
pressures  only through  their  effects  on policy,  and hence  this measure  is a valid
instrument.
22The second  instrument  is the ex post available  information  on  the country's
borrowing  from the International  Monetary  Fund. If a country  comes  under  speculative
attack,  it may seek  resources  from  the IMF  for temporary  balance  of payments  support.
To the extent  that the IMF places  conditions  on the stance  of monetary  policy  prior  to
agreeing  to such  support,  changes  in observed  IMF  borrowing  will be correlated  with  the
indicators  of monetary  policy  around  the speculative  attack episode  in question.  To the
extent  that speculators  have imperfect  information  as to the substance  of the country's
negotiations  with  the IMF,  the IMF's  influence  over  monetary  policy  will be known  to the
monetary  authority,  but not to speculators.  I therefore  proxy  for the presence  of IMF
involvement  by the change  in a country's  borrowing  from  the IMF in the three  months
following  the speculative  attack  relative  to the three  months  prior to the attack,  and use
this variable  as an instrument  for policy.
Obviously  these  instruments  are imperfect. First,  they may  not be truly
exogenous.  There  may be unobserved  episode-specific  characteristics  which  both  raise
the probability  that an attack  fails  and also accelerate  reserve  losses  or trigger IMF
involvement. Second,  despite  caricatures  to the contrary,  the involvement  of the IMF
may  not be significantly  correlated  with the subsequent  stance  of monetary  policy. The
first objection  is easily  addressed  if the instruments  pass  tests of overidentifying
restrictions.  The second  objection  concerns  the strength  of the instruments.  As is well
known  (Nelson  and Startz  (1990),  Staiger  and Stock (1997)),  if the instruments  are only
weakly  correlated  with  the endogenous  variables,  two-stage  least  squares  coefficient
estimates  will be biased  towards  the probability  limits  of their uninstrumented
counterparts  in finite  samples. That is, instrumenting  with  weak instruments  will not
correct  the problem  of endogeneity.  This caveat  should  be kept in mind,  since  in many
cases  the explanatory  power  of the instruments  is not as large  as I would  like.
I estimate  Equation  (5) using  Amemiya's  (1978)  generalized  least  squares
estimator  for probit  models  with  endogenous  regressors. This is a two-stage  procedure,
in which  the observed  dependent  variable  yj and the endogenous  variables  are first  all
regressed  on the exogenous  variables  and the instruments.  Amemiya's  insight  is that,
provided  that the model  is over-  identified,  the structural  parameters  in Equation  (5)  can
be retrieved  from a GLS regression  of the reduced  form parameters  of the first-stage
regression  involving  the dependent  variable  on the reduced-form  parameters  from the
23remaining  first-stage  regressions. As shown  by Newey  (1987),  this method  is
asymptotically  equivalent  to a minimum  chi-squared  estimator  and is the most  efficient
method  to extract  structural  from reduced-form  paraimeter  estimates. Finally,  Lee
(1991)  provides  a test of overidentifying  restrictions  for this model.
Results
The results  of this instrumental  variables  probit  specification  are  presented  in
Tables  7 and 8 for the full sample  and the financially-developed  subsample,
respectively.  Each  table reports  the results  of 15  probit regressions  (three  measures  of
policy  times  five measures  of fundamentals),  with  a dummy  variable  taking on the value
one if the attack  fails  as the dependent  variable. For each regression,  I report  the
estimated  coefficients,  their standard  errors,  and the corresponding  marginal  effect  of
an increase  in the right-hand  side variable  on the probability  that a speculative  attack
fails. In order  to assess  the validity  of the instruments,  I report  the p-value  associated
with  the test of overidentifying  restrictions  (which  tests  the null hypothesis  that the
instruments  affect  the outcome  of the attack  only through  their effects  on policy)  and  the
p-value  associated  with  a test of the null  hypothesis  that the instruments  are  jointly
significant  in the first-stage  regression  of the policy  variable  on the instruments.
The results  in Tables  7 and 8 provide  very  little evidence  of the efficacy  of tight
monetary  policy  as a defense  against  speculative  attacks. In all but two regressions,  the
coefficient  on the policy  variable  is not statistically  sig  nificantly  different  from zero, and
the estimated  marginal  effects  are  generally  tiny. The only  exception  is when  policy  is
measured  as  the change  in bank  reserves,  and the fundamentals  are proxied  by the
presence  of banking  crises  or indebtedness  to the IMF. For these two cases,  the
estimated  effect  of policy  is negative  -- a tightening  of monetary  policy  lowers  the
probability  that a speculative  attack  fails. However,  this evidence  in favour  of "perverse"
effects  of tighter  monetary  policy  should  not be taken  too seriously,  given  the large
number  of other  specifications  which  do not corroborate  this finding.
An important  caveat  regarding  Tables  7 and 8 concerns  the validity  of the
instruments.  Although  in all cases  the instruments  comfortably  pass  tests of
overidentifying  restrictions,  in many  cases  they have  rather  weak explanatory  power  for
24policy. This  implies  that the estimates  are  likely  to be biased  towards  the probability
limits  of their  uninstrumented  counterparts,  and hence  may  still be tainted  by
endogeneity  bias. While this is unfortunate,  it is not clear a priori  whether  this will result
in a systematic  overstatement  or understatement  of the effects  of monetary  policy,  given
the previous  discussion  that the direction  of the endogeneity  bias is theoretically
ambiguous.
255.  Conclusions
Do high  interest  rates  help  to defend  exchange  rates  that come  under
speculative  attack? The evidence  considered  in this paper  suggests  that the answer  is
no. Although  proponents  of the view that high  interest  rates can  support  a currency
under  attack  can point  to episodes  such as Sweden  in the summer  of 1992,  while
proponents  of the contrarian  view that high  interest  rates  weaken  currencies  can  point  to
Korea  in the fall of 1997  as supportive  anecdotes,  a systematic  examination  of interest
rates around  a large  number  of historical  speculative  attack episodes  indicates  a striking
lack  of evidence  that the stance  of monetary  policy  is correlated  with  the outcome  of
speculative  attacks. In particular,  I find no evidence  that interest  rates  systematically
increase  or decrease  during  failed  speculative  attacks,  nor that raising  interest  rates
lowers  or raises  the probability  that a speculative  attack  fails. This basic  finding  is
robust  to alternative  measures  of the stance  of monetary  policy,  to interactions  which
control  for differences  in fundamentals  across  speculative  attack  episodes,  and to
controlling  for the endogeneity  of the policy  response  to a speculative  attack.
Nevertheless,  several  shortcomings  of this paper  suggest  that it may be
premature  to conclude  that monetary  policy  is entirely  ineffective  in during  speculative
attacks. In the interests  of covering  a sample  of spieculative  attacks  large  enough  to
include  interesting  variation  in  the outcome  of speculative  attacks,  the policy  response  to
the speculative  attack,  and the fundamentals  that are likely  to determine  both  the
outcome  of the attack  and the efficacy  of the policy  response,  I have  made  several
compromises  with  regards  to data  and methodology. Three  such  compromises,  and
possible  strategies  to avoid  them in future  research,  deserve  mention.
First,  I have  relied  on readily-available  but relatively  low-frequency  monthly  data
to identify  speculative  attacks  and  the response  of policy. This is unfortunate  given  that
much  of the economically  interesting  variation  during  speculative  attack  episodes  is
likely  to occur  at much  higher daily,  or even hourly,  frequencies.  The use  of monthly
data  also precludes  modeling  the likely  path-dependence  in the effects  of interest  rates
on speculative  pressures,  a point emphasized  by Drazen  (1999). Moving  to high-
frequency  data  for the more  limited  sample  of speculative  attacks  for which  such  data is
26available  may  uncover  evidence  of the effects  of monetary  policy  that are  obscured  by
the low frequency  and absence  of dynamics  in the present  paper.
Second,  in this paper I have  relied  on  the very  crude  indicators  of monetary
policy  that can readily  be constructed  from available  monthly  data. However,  as noted
earlier,  monetary  authorities  have  a wide  variety  of instruments  at their  disposal,
including  open  market  operations,  direct  interventions  in foreign  exchange  markets,
imposition  of credit  ceilings,  etc. Disentangling  these  interventions  from the observed
fluctuations  in observable  high-frequency  data, and modeling  the choice  between
instruments  over  time and across  episodes,  is essential  to obtaining  a better
understanding  of the role of monetary  policy  during  speculative  attacks.
Third,  in this paper I have  relied  on what  turn out to be rather  weak instruments
to extract  the exogenous  component  monetary  policy. While it is theoretically  unclear
how  this will systematically  bias  the results  -- given  that the direction  of the endogeneity
bias is ambiguous  -- it is nevertheless  unsatisfying  if one is interested  in understanding
the effects  of monetary  policy  during  speculative  attacks. One possibility  for progress
on this  front is that by switching  to higher  frequency  data,  the more pronounced
informational  asymmetries  between  speculators  and the monetary  authority  will result  in
more  robust  instruments.  Another  is to carefully  investigate  the institutional  peculiarities
of the monetary  authority  during  individual  speculative  attack  episodes  in the hopes  of
identifying  changes  in these institutions  which  might  serve  as valid instruments.
Implementing  these improvements  for a sufficiently  large set of speculative
attack  episodes  that span  the relevant  range  of country  experiences  will take time. Until
then, however,  it seems  that the burden  of proof  for both  the conventional  wisdom  that
raising  interest  rates  strengthens  currencies  under  speculative  attack,  and also the
contrarian  view  that it weakens  them,  lies with  the proponents  of these  views.
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30Appendix:  Data Sources
The monthly  data  employed  in this paper  are drawn  from the International
Financial  Statistics  of the International  Monetary  Fund,  as follows:
*  Nominal  exchange,  local  currency  units  per  US dollar,  period  average  (IFS Line  rF).
*  Non-gold  reserves,  US dollars  (IFS Line  1I.d)
*  Money  market  rate, percent  (IFS Line  60b)
*  Discount  rate, percent  per  year,  end of period (IFS Line 60). For France,  Singapore
Sweden  and  the Netherlands  after December  1993,  I use repurchase  rates  (IFS  Line
60a)
*  Domestic  credit,  local  currency  units  (IFS  Line  32)
*  Reserves  of deposit  money  banks,  local  currency  units  (IFS Line 20)
*  Consumer  price  index (IFS  Line  64). For  Australia  and Ireland,  I use  the wholesale
price  index  (IFS Line  63)
*  Imports,  c.i.f., US  dollars  (IFS Line  71)
*  Total IMF  credits  and loans  outstanding  (IFS Line  2tl)
*  IMF  quota (IFS  Line 2t)
Lower-frequency  data corresponding  to the speculative  attack  episodes  are
drawn  from various  sources.
*  Domestic  credit  to the private  sector  as a share  of GDP  is drawn  from the World
Bank  World  Tables (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS)
*  The black  market  premium  is drawn  from Easterly  and Levine  (1997)
*  Annual  real GDP  growth is constant  price  local  currency  GDP  figures  drawn  from  the
World  Bank  World  Tables (NY.GDP.MKTP.KN)
*  Data  on banking  crises  are based  on the IMF's  May 1998  edition  of the World
Economic  Outlook,  and augmented  using  the original  sources in Caprio  and
Klingebiel  (1997)  and Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997).
The sample  of countries  consists  of all countries  with  per capita GNP  greater  than  $800
in 1995  at Atlas exchange  rates  and with  populations  greater  than one million,  i.e.  the
31World  Bank's  definition  of middle-  and upper-income  countries  in that year. From  this
sample,  I drop  Chile,  Algeria,  Panama,  Romania,  Saudi  Arabia,  El Salvador  and
Turkmenistan  because  requisite  data  on discount  rates  was not available.
The daily  data  in Figure  1 are  drawn  from Bloomberg:  SEK -- Swedish  krona/US
dollar,  spot,  mid-rate,  SWBRMRGN  -- marginal  lending  rate, mid-rate,  KRW,  won/US
dollar,  spot, mid-rate,  and KWCR1T,  overnight  call rate, mid-rate.
32Table 1: Successful  and Failed Speculative Attacks
Successful  Attacks  Failed  Attacks
Large  Reserve  Losses  Large  Spreads
ISR  62:2  BWA  84:7  BOL  62:1'  PER  76:5  PHL  87:9'  OEU  73:3-
COL  65:9-  PRY  84:3  DEU  62:1-  PRT  75:10  TTO  87:1  ESP  74:5'
ARG  66:11'  THA  84:11'  GTM  62:6  DNK  76:7'  ZAF  87:11  MYS  74:6'
ESP  67:11'  VEN  84:2  PER  62:7'  DOM  76:1  GAS  88:5'  DNK  76:4'
FIN  67:10'  ZAF  84:7'  COL  64:7-  FRA  76:4-  GRC  88:3  ESP  76:7-
GBR  67:12'  AUS  85:2'  MAR  64:6  GBR  76:4'  GTM  88:7  ITA  76:3'
IRL  67:12'  DOM  85:1  SYR  64-8  JAM  76:5  KWr  88:7  NLD  76:8'
ISR  67:11'  ECU  85:12  CHE  65:1'  MAR  76:4'  BOL  89:12'  GBR  781'
JAM  67:12'  TTO  85:12  GBR  65:1'  SWE  76:10'  DOM  89:7  NLD  78:10'
MUS  67:12  GTM  8686  GTM  85:5*  SYR  78:3'  MAR  89:3'  CAN  79:1'
PER  67:9'  IDN  86:9  DOM  68:6  TUR  76:10'  GRC  90:3'  DNK  79:9'
TTO  67:12  PRY  86:12  CHE  67:1'  ZAW  76:2'  MEX  90:3  ARG  80:10'
FRA  69:8'  VEN  86:12  COL  67:1  CHE  77:1-  FIN  91:5'  CAN  80:4'
ARG  70:6'  DOM  87:6'  ESP  67:3'  DNK  77:12'  JOR  918'  BEL  81:4'
ECU  70:8  PER  87:11  SYR  67:12  GAB  771'  TUN  91:4'  MYS  81:10'
PHL  70:3  SYR  88:1  CHE  68:7'  MUS  77:8'  ZAP  91:12'  NOR  81:12
TUR  70:8'  GTM  89:11'  CRI  68:11  NOR  77:11'  CAN  92:11'  ESP  82:5'
ISR  71:8  ISR  89:1  DNK  68:10'  CAN  782'  DEU  92:10'  ESP  842'
KOR  71:7  PRY  89:3  ECU  68:3  CRI  78:10'  ESP  92:9'  MYS  84:10
URY  71:12  VEN  89:3  FRA  68:6'  MUS  78:11  GAB  929'  MEX  85:3
BOL  72:11  DOM  90:4  GAB  68:2  ZAF  78:12'  IRL  92:9'  TUR  86:7'
JAM  731'  HUN  91:1  PHL  68:11  CAN  79:5'  NAM  92:4  TUR  89:11'
AUS  74:10'  POL  91:6  TTo  68:11  DOM  79:7  TTO  92:1  IDN  90:12
ISR  74:11  TUR  91:3'  DEU  69:1'  GAB  79:3  BOL  93:1'  PRT  90:10'
KOR  74:12'  BWA  92:7  FIN  69:5'  JAM  79:8  ONK  931'  POL  91:2'
ARG  75:1  ECU  92:9'  URY  69:10'  SYR  79:8'  FRA  93:11'  ARG  92:7
PER  75:10  FIN  92:9'  CRI  70:7'  URY  79:3'  BOL  94:2'  KWT  92:11
ZAF  75:10'  GBR  92:10'  DOM  70:5  OL  80:4'  DOM  948  NOR  92:9'
AUS  76:12'  LBN  92:3  ECU  70:1  ONK  80:2'  MEX  94.4'  PRT  92:9'
MEX  76:9'  SWE  92:11'  ITA  70:7'  PER  80:1'  SVK  94:7  POL  93:6
ESP  77:7'  TTO  93:4  SYR  70:12  PRT  80:2'  TTO  94:5'  URY  93:6
ISR  77:11'  GAB  94:1'  TWN  70:7  AUS  81:9'  ZAP  94:3'  ARG  94:12
PER  77:11  MEX  94:12'  ARG  71:10  CAN  81:7'  ARG  95:3  LVA  94:5
PRT  77:3'  VEN  95:12'  DNK  71:4'  GTM  81:6  GAB  95:r  MAR  94:1'
IDN  78:11'  BGR  96:5  ECU  71:9  MEX  81:6'  ZAF  95:4'  POL  94:9
JAM  78:5  GTM  97:1'  IDN  71:12'  MUS  81:3'  BGR  96:1  COL  95:4'
TUR  78:3  IDN  97:8'  KOR  71:12  MAR  82:6'  GRC  96:5'  THA  951'
BOL  79:12'  KOR  97:11'  LBN  71:2'  MUS  82:6  NAM  96:9  DOM  96:6
MUS  79:11'  MKO  97:7  MAR  71:10'  PHL  82:1'  SWE  96:11'  LVA  96:2
TUR  79:6  PHL  97:9'  CRI  72:2  URY  82:1'  FIN  97:11'  RUS  98:9
KOR  80:1  THA  97:7'  GBR  72:7'  GAB  83:11'  IRL  97:4'  URY  96:9
ARG  81:2'  BWA  98:7  GAB  73:6  CAN  84:6'  NOR  97:12'  BRA  97:11
CRI  81:1'  MOA  98:10  SYR  73:2  DNK  84:12'  RUS  97:11  EST  97:11
MUS  81:10'  MEX  98:9'  ZAF  73:11'  COL  65:1  BRA  98:9  POL  979
BOL  82:2  NAM  98:7  DOM  74:1  JOR  85:3'  CAN  98:8'  UKR  97:12
ECU  82:5  RUS  98:9  ITA  74:2'  PHL  85:10'  HKG  98:8'
FIN  82:10'  UKR  98:9  JAM  74:5'  CAN  86:3'  URY  98:9
MEX  82:2'  ZAP  98:7'  KOR  74:7'  DOM  88:5'
PRT  82:6  BRA  99:1  MUS  74:5  FIN  86:8'
SWE  82:10'  KAZ  99:4  URY  74:4'  JAM  86:10
URY  82:12'  AUS  75:12'  KOR  86:1'
GRC  83:1  8OL  75:9'  BOL  87:3
ION  83:4'  CRI  75:10'  CAN  87:4'
JAM  83:11'  GAB  75:1'  GAB  87:1'
PHL  83:10  IDN  75:3'  KOR  87:12
ITA  75:7'
Note: * indicates  attacks  in the financially-developed  subsample.
33Table 2: Selected Speculative Attack Episodes
Country  Date  Classification  % Growth  in:
of  Attack  Exchange  Rate Reserves
Asia  1997
Indonesia  97:8  Succeed  11.2%  -4.7%
Korea  97:11  Succeed  11.3%  -19.6%
Malaysia  1/  97:8  n/a  6.6%  1.4%
Philippines  97:7  Succeed  10.4%  6.1%
Thailand  97:7  Succeed  17.6%  -6.1%
Europe  1992-93
Belgium  2/  92:11  n/a  7.2%  -14.3%
Denmark  3/  93:1  Fail  1.9%  -28.6%
France  41  93:11  Fail  2.8%  -22.7%
Ireland  5/  92:09  Fail  0.3%  -3.8%
Italy6/  92:10  n/a  11.6%  7.7%
United  Kingdom  7/  92:10  Succeed  11.6%  -4.4%
Spain  8/  92:09  Fail  4.5%  -20.0%
Sweden  92:11  Succeed  11.5%  -24.6%
Finland  92:11  Succeed  11.6%  1.9%
11  Nominal  devaluation  too  small  to  qualify  as successful  attack.
2/ Nominal  devaluation  too  smail  to  qualify  as successful  attack.  ERW  date  is 92:9.
3/ ERW  date  is 92:9.
41  ERW  date  is 92:9.
5/  ERW  date  is 92:11.
61  ERW date  is 92:9. Exchange  rate  too  volatile  prior  to attack  to qualify  as  successful  attack.
7/  ERW date  is 92:8.
8/ Subsequent  devaluation  of  peseta  in 92:10  too  smail  to prevent  classification  as failed  attack.
ERW: Eichengreen,Rose  and  Wyplosz  (1994).




Succeeds  Fails  Total
Monetary Policy
Tightens  37  95  132
Eases  40  72  112
Total  77  167  244
Estimate  95% Confidence  Interval
P[Tightens  i Fails]  0.57  0.49  0.65
P[Fails  I  Tightens]  0.72  0.64  0.80
P-Value  for Independence  0.20
Domestic Credit Growth
Speculative  Attack:
Succeeds  Fails  Total
Monetary  Policy
Tightens  41  83  124
Eases  59  101  160
Total  100  184  284
Estimate  95% Confidence  Interval
P[Tightens  I Fails]  0.45  0.38  0.52
P[Fails  I Tightens]  0.67  0.58  0.75
P-Value  for Independence  0.50
Bank Reserves
Speculative  Attack:
Succeeds  Fails  Total
Monetary  Policy
Tightens  39  58  97
Eases  47  119  166
Total  86  177  263
Estimate  95%  Confidence  Interval
P[Tightens  I Fails]  0.33  0.26  0.40
P[Fails  I  Tightens]  0.60  0.50  0.70
P-Value  for Independence  0.05
Notes:  The  contingency  tables  report  the  distribution  of  speculative  attacks  according  to  a two-way
classification  of  whether  monetary  policy  tightened  or  not  using  the  indicated  measure  of  monetary  policy,  and
whether  the  attack  succeeded  or  failed.  P(Tightens  I  Fails]  reports  the  conditional  probability  that  monetary
policy  tightens  during  failed  attacks,  and  P[Fails  I  Tightens]  reports  the  conditional  probability  that  the  attack
fails  during  episodes  where  monetary  policy  tightens.  P-Value  for Independence  reports  the  p-value
associated  with  a chi-squared  test  of  independence  of  the  rows  and  columns  of  the  contingency  table.




Succeeds  Fails  Total
Monetary  Policy
Tightens  13  47  60
Eases  15  40  55
Total  28  87  115
Estimate  95%  Confidence  Interval
P[Tightens  j Fails]  0.54  0.43  0.65
P[Fails  I  Tightens]  0.78  0.68  0.89
P-Value  for Independence  0.48
Domestic Credilt  Growth
Speculative  Attack:
Succeeds  Fails  Total
Monetary  Policy
Tightens  14  35  49
Eases  22  49  71
Total  36  84  120
Estimate  95%  Confidence  Interval
P[Tightens  I Fails]  0.42  0.31  0.52
P[Fails  I Tightens]  0.71  0.59  0.84
P-Value  for Independence  0.78
Bank Reserves
Speculative  Attack:
Succeeds  Fails  Total
Monetary  Policy
Tightens  17  29  46
Eases  18  53  71
Total  35  82  117
Estimate  95%  Confidence  Interval
P[Tightens  I  Fails)  0.35  0.25  0.46
P[Fails  I Tightens]  0.63  0.49  0.77
P-Value  for Independence  0.18
Notes:  The  contingency  tables  report  the distribution  of speculative  attacks  according  to a two-way
classification  of  whether  monetary  policy  tightened  or not using  the indicated  measure  of monetary  policy,  and
whether  the attack  succeeded  or failed. P[Tightens  I Failsj  reports  the conditional  probability  that  monetary
policy  tightens  during  failed  attacks,  and  P[Fails  I  Tightens]  reports  the conditional  probability  that  the  attack
fails  during  episodes  where  monetary  policy  tightens. P-Value  for Independence  reports  the p-value
associated  with  a chi-squared  test of independence  of  the rows  and  columns  of the contingency  table.
36Table 5:  Weaker  Tests of Necessity and Sufficiency
(Full Sample)
Increase  in Real  Discount  Rate
Failed  Successful  Marginal  Number  of
Attacks  Attacks  P-Value  Effect  t-Statistic  Observations
Full  Sample  1.342  -3.111  0.085  0.003  1.752  239
OECD  1.173  -8.492  0.040  0.006  2.163  88
1980s  and  1990s  -1.378  -2.847  0.644  0.001  0.471  136
No Banking  Crises  1.655  -3.127  0.123  0.003  1.601  188
No  Real  Overvaluation  1.652  -1.279  0.437  0.002  0.861  113
High  Reserves  1.067  -4.784  0.123  0.003  1.509  124
Low  Quota  Drawings  1.411  1.021  0.892  0.000  0.119  112
High  Point  in Cycle  0.391  -2.443  0.526  0.001  0.677  116
Decrease  in Real  Domestic  Credit  Growth
Full  Sample  -3.657  0.404  0.482  -0.001  -0.717  230
OECD  -1.779  13.801  0.056  -0.002  -1.623  75
1980s  and  1990s  -2.043  -4.808  0.734  0.000  0.348  131
No  Banking  Crises  -4.032  4.096  0.204  -0.001  -1.298  184
No  Real  Overvaluation  0.499  7.143  0.452  -0.001  -0.790  109
High  Reserves  -1.515  1.907  0.677  0.000  -0.437  123
Low  Quota  Drawings  1.628  -3.868  0.501  0.001  0.674  100
High  Point  in  Cycle  -6.527  1.848  0.316  -0.001  -1.001  125
Increase  in Bank  Reserves
Full  Sample  -0.522  -0.140  0.073  -0.033  -1.777  263
OECD  -0.295  0.038  0.131  -0.071  -1.147  77
1980s  and  1990s  -0.399  -0.200  0.450  -0.017  -0.726  154
No  Banking  Crises  -0.652  -0.328  0.128  -0.033  -1.445  204
No  Real  Overvaluation  -0.536  0.031  0.017  -0.052  -1.841  126
High  Reserves  -0.544  -0.099  0.172  -0.033  -1.403  142
Low  Quota  Drawings  -0.483  -0.380  0.741  -0.009  -0.321  114
High  Point  in  Cycle  -0.519  -0.208  0.279  -0.021  -0.950  143
Notes: The  first  two columns  report  the mean  value  of the indicated  policy  variable  during  failed  and
successful  attacks,  in the indicated  subsample  of events.  The  third  column  reports  the p-value  associated
with  a test of the null  hypothesis  that  the means  are equal  in the two  samples. The  fourth  column  reports  the
estimated  marginal  effect  of policy  in a probit  regression  expressing  the probability  that a speculative  attack
fails as  a function  of a constant  and  the indicated  policy  variable,  in the indicated  subsample  of events.  The
fifth  column  reports  the t-statistic  associated  with  the estimate  of the underlying  slope  coefricient.  The  final
column  indicates  the number  of  observations  for  which  the policy  variables  are  available  in the indicated
subsample  of  events.
37Table 6:  Weaker Tests of Necessity  and Sufficiency
(Financially-Developed  Sample)
Increase  in Real  Discount  Rate
Failed  Successful  Marginal  Number  of
Attacks  Attacks  PI-Value  Effect  t-Statistic  Observations
Full  Sample  -0.155  -4.464  0.177  0.004  1.409  115
OECD  0.725  -11.236  0.016  0.008  2.540  71
1980s  and  1990s  -1.671  -0.972  0.836  -0.001  -0.214  65
No Banking  Crises  1.181  -4.713  0.127  0.005  1.535  84
No Real  Overvaluation  1.728  -1.163  0.555  0.003  0.640  56
High  Reserves  -0.267  -4.331  0.260  0.004  1.130  71
Low  Quota  Drawings  0.785  -1.590  0.556  0.002  0.515  66
High  Point  in Cycle  -0.664  -6.405  0.242  0.005  1.258  57
Decrease  in Real  Domestic  Credit  Growl.h
Full  Sample  -7.339  -3.195  0.561  -0.001  -0.542  108
OECD  -5.725  6.347  0.103  -0.002  -1.191  63
1980s  and  1990s  -8.812  -4.203  0.635  -0.001  -0.438  61
No Banking  Crises  -6.166  3.530  0.233  -0.001  -1.083  83
No Real  Overvaluation  1.780  -2.841  0.635  0.001  0.458  54
High  Reserves  -7.870  -0.305  0.457  -0.001  -0.751  67
Low  Quota  Drawings  -3.078  -1.327  0.806  0.000  -0.170  62
High  Point  in Cycle  -11.119  0.831  0.280  -0.001  -0.986  55
Increase  in Bank  Reserves
Full  Sample  -0.247  0.280  0.117  -0.050  -1.654  117
OECD  -0.340  -0.081  0.246  -0.046  .- 0.757  64
1980s  and  1990s  -0.099  0.220  0.339  -0.033  -0.837  68
No Banking  Crises  -0.380  -0.066  0.149  -0.065  -1.161  87
No Real  Overvaluation  -0.246  0.017  0.255  -0.064  -t).808  57
High  Reserves  -0.454  0.304  0.141  -0.064  -1.512  65
Low  Quota  Drawings  -0.391  0.056  0.273  -0.052  -1.107  65
High  Point  in Cycle  -0.071  0.350  0 224  -0.040  C.0.994  61
Notes:  The  first  two  columns  report  the  mean  value  of  the  indicated  policy  variable  during  failed  and
successful  attacks,  in  the  indicated  subsample  of  events.  The  third  column  reports  the  p-value  associated
with  a test  of  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  means  are  equal  in the  two  samples.  The  fourth  column  reports  the
estimated  marginal  effect  of  policy  in  a probit  regression  expressing  the  probability  that  a speculative  attack
fails  as  a function  of a constant  and  the  indicated  policy  variable,  in the  indicated  subsample  of  events.  The
fifth  column  reports  the  t-statistic  associated  with  the  estimate  of  the  underlying  slope  coefficient.  The  final
column  indicates  the  number  of  observations  for  which  the  policy  variables  are  available  in  the  indicated
subsample  of  events.
38Table  7: Controlling  for the Endogeneity  of Policy
(Full  Sample)
Fundamental  (f):
Banking  Real  Reserves/  IMF  Growth
Crisis  Overvaluation Imports  Borrowing  Deviation
Increase  in Real  Discount Rate
i  01  0.015  0.009  -0.142  0.037  -0.052
se(13)  0.152  0.462  0.188  0.129  0.220
dP[Fail]/d13  0.005  0.003  -0.017  0.012  -0.012
ixf  13  -0.070  0.000  0.090  0.000  0.013
se(p)  0.244  0.040  0.095  0.001  0.031
dP[Faildtdp  -0.024  0.000  0.011  0.000  0.003
f  1  -0.221  0.011  -0.192  -0.002  -0.061
se(1)  1.955  0.265  0.295  0.004  0.308
dP[Failydo  -0.074  0.004  -0.023  -0.001  -0.014
p-OlD  0.830  0.985  0.628  0.702  0.918
p-FSR  0.031  0.134  0.102  0.015  0.145
Number  of Observations  202  199  191  202  180
Decrease  in Real  Domestic  Credit  Growth
i  13  -0.105  -0.093  0.118  -0.065  0.001
se(p)  0.134  0.110  0.226  0.084  0.081
dP[Fail]/d13  -0.011  -0.008  0.011  -0.011  0.000
ixf  ,  0.137  -0.007  -0.038  0.000  -0.002
se(f3)  0.162  0.009  0.052  0.000  0.017
dP[FaillJd  0.014  -0.001  -0.004  0.000  -0.001
f  1  0.652  0.019  0.215  -0.002  0.051
se(13)  1.538  0.055  0.432  0.003  0.187
dPVFaill/d13  0.066  0.002  0.021  0.000  0.017
p-OlD  0.716  0.848  0.759  0.559  0.915
p-FSR  0.329  0.762  0.477  0.682  0.075
Number  of Observations  200  197  191  199  182
Increase  in Bank  Reserves
i  13  -1.339-  -2.266  -4.834  -2.122*  -1.298
se(1)  0.574  5.489  3.419  1.191  1.725
dP[Failydo  -0.254  -0.229  -0.506  -0.263  -0.213
ixf  p  2.465  -0.065  0.850  0.004  -0.083
se(D)  1.919  0.245  0.764  0.006  0.129
dP[FailIl/dp  0.467  -0.007  0.089  0.001  -0.014
f  .1  1.345  -0.029  0.451  0.004  -0.022
se(13)  0.841  0.168  0.496  0.003  0.160
dP[Faill/d13  0.255  -0.003  0.047  0.000  -0.004
p-OlD  0.957  0.952  0.833  0.736  0.730
p-FSR  0.051  0.155  0.633  0.357  0.087
Number  of Observations  229  226  218  228  215
Notes: This table reports the results  of a probit regression which expresses the probabiiity that a speculative
attack fails as a function of the monetary  policy response (i), a fundamental (f), and the interaction  between
the two (ixf),  for the indicated measures  of policies and fundamentals. All regressions  also include  a
constant. The rows labelled ,B,  se(,B),  and dP[Fail]/d,B  report the estimated coefficient, its standard  error, and
the estimated marginal  effect. The policy variable and its interaction  with the fundamental  are treated as
endogenous,  and are instrumented  using the contemporaneous  change in reserves  and the change  in IMF
lending,  and their interactions  with fundamentals. The model is estimated using Amemiya's  two-stage GLS
procedure  for instrumental  variables probit models. p-OlD reports the p-value  for the test of overidentifying
restrictions,  and p-FSR reports the p-value  for the null hypothesis  that the instruments  are jointly insignificant
in the first-stage regression  of the policy variable  on the instruments.  * (*) denotes significance  at the 10%
(5%) level.
39Table 8: Controlling for the Endogeneity  of Policy
(Financially-Developed  Sample)
Fundamental  (f):
Banking  Real  Reserves/  IMF  Growth
Crisis  Overvaluation Imports  Borrowing Deviation
Increase  in Real Discount Rate
i  3  -0-039  0.105  -0.004  0.333  -0.005
se(,)  6.700  0.167  0.381  0.395  0.796
dP[Failyd13  -0.010  0.020  -0.001  0.032  -0.001
ixf  0  -0.053  -0.009  0.022  -0.001  0.001
se(p)  9.661  0.010  0.081  0.002  0.097
dP[Failydp  -0.013  -C.002  0.006  0.000  0.000
f  p  -0.907  -0.029  0.024  0.000  0.034
se(p)  28.351  0.069  0.378  0.008  0.757
dP[Failyd3  -0.222  -0.006  0.007  0.000  0.010
p-OlD  0.993  0.779  0.915  0.886  0.961
p-FSR  0.366  0.091  0.386  0.479  0.228
Number  of Observations  105  104  104  105  104
Decrease  in Real Domestic Credit Growth
i  13  0.007  -0.044  -0.010  -0.979  0.055
se(p)  0.628  0.062  0.114  12.762  3.053
dPEFail]/d13  0.002  -0.008  -0.003  -0.013  0.008
ixf  1  0.010  0.004  0.004  0.004  -0.011
se(p)  1.114  0.006  0.025  0.046  0.605
dPtFailyd1  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.000  -0.002
f  p  -0.217  0.018  0.060  -0.006  -0.106
se(p)  8.346  0.060  0:379  0.078  7.385
dP[Fail]1d13  -0.067  0.003  0.019  0.000  -0.016
p-OlD  0.957  0.705  0.716  1.000  0.999
p-FSR  0.306  0.591  0.466  0.259  0.228
Number  of Observations  98  97  98  98  96
Increase  in Bank Reserves
i  1  -2.946  -2.590  -2.811  -0.864  -6.951
se(p)  1.824  9.620  2.661  12.202  162.283
dP[Failydp  -0.320  -0.261  -0.648  -0.193  -0.251
ixf  ,B  2.080  0.116  0.674  -0.001  -0.681
se(13)  5.179  0.921  0.861  0.055  15.232
dP[Failyd13  0.226  0.012  0.155  0.000  -0.025
f  1  1.834  0.0118  0.163  0.002  -0.042
se(p)  1.847  0.420  0.286  0.062  2.365
dP[Faillyd  0.199  0.002  0.038  0.000  -0.002
p-OlD  0.712  0.903  0.649  0.956  0.996
p-FSR  0.620  0.965  0.612  0.347  0.897
Number  of Observations  105  104  104  105  105
Notes: This table reports the results of a probit regression  which expresses the probability that a speculative
attack fails as a function of the monetary  policy response (i), a fundamental (f), and the interaction  between
the two (ixt),  for the indicated measures  of policies and fundamentals. All regressions also include a
constant. The rows labelled 1,  se(3), and dP[Faillid13  report the estimated coefficient, its standard error, and
the estimated marginal  effect.  The policy variable and its interaction  with the fundamental are treated  as
endogenous, and are instrumented using the contemporaneous  change in reserves and the change in IMF
lending, and their interactions  with fundamentals. The model  is estimated using Amemiya's  two-stage GLS
procedure  for instrumental  variables probit models. p-OlD reports the p-value for the test of overidentifying
restrictions, and p-FSR reports the p-value  for the null hypothesis  that the instruments are jointly insignificant
in the first-stage regression of the policy variable on the instnrments. . * ()  denotes significance  at the 10%
(5%) level.
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the median nominal exchange rate and reserves during
successful  and  failed  speculative  attacks.  The  figures  are  constructed  by  cumulating  the median  (across
all episodes)  growth  rate  of the indicated  variables  to a base  of 100  twelve  months  prior to  the attack.
42Figure 3:  Changes in Real Discount  Rates During
Successful  and Failed Speculative  Attacks
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Notes: This figure shows the frequency distribution of percentage changes in real discount rates during
successful and failed speculative attacks. The mean changes during successful and failed attacks are
based on changes in real discount rates less than 25% in absolute value.




°0.7  - 2(i)







0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  0.25  0.3
Interest  Rate





70(i),  Low Reserves
o  0.6  -
0.2 - 0





0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  0.25  0.3
Interest  Rate
44Figure 5:  The Endogeneity of Policy
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